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The possibility of self-responsibility: discussing 
with Heidegger’s concept of ‘schuldig’
Kiha HAN
1	 Preface
In this essay, I am going to discuss the possibility of ‘self-responsibility’ which is 
inspired by Heidegger’s concept of ‘schuldig’. I want to prove that the possibility of ‘self-
responsibility’ can overcome the challenge from Nihilism. The meaning of Nihilism that I will 
describe here denies not only the transcendental entity but also the meaning of our own life, 
which makes us live or take responsibility on it. I believe answering this problem is important 
for those living in the modern era of skepticism. Nowadays, we rarely believe that the 
supernatural entity is involved in our lives or has a causal power in the physical world. If we 
accept the scientiﬁc view of the world, then it seems right that there is nothing for us to be rely 
on. Camus once focused on this idea, and tried to ﬁnd that there is a reason to live : 
Judging whether life is or is not worth living amounts to answering the fundamental 
question of philosophy[1]
He did not suggest his answer with arguing that there is something which forces us to 
live. Moreover, he did not try to construct the existence of the transcendental entity which 
gives us reason to live, and he tried to overcome the challenge which he himself suggested 
without anything but one’s existence. He shows it, in part, with a metaphorical 
demonstration about Sisyphus. It is not told clearly, however, how we could be responsible 
in a philosophical way which should be shown clearly with strict propositions. To make it 
clear, I am going to show how self-responsibility can be possible, suggesting its formal 
structure. This suggestion would be insisted with referring to Heidegger’s concept of 
‘schuldig (guilt)’ and his argument that all the Daseins are ‘schuldig’ fundamentally.
In chapter one, I will show that the Nihilism’s argument, denying reason to live, is relying 
	
1	 Camus, Albert. (2013). The myth of Sisyphus. Penguin UK. 1.p
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on the modern right-duty-concept. Then, I will describe why we couldn’t refute the argument of 
Nihilism. It is because of what we also have presupposed, and that is the concept of modern right 
and duty. In chapter two, I will describe Heidegger’s concept of ‘schuldig’ with his core concept 
of ‘thrownness’ and ‘projection’. Then, I will make it clear by interpreting it into a formal 
deﬁnition of self-responsibility. In the third chapter, I will make my argument speciﬁc to present 
some examples which can be explained by the deﬁnition of self-responsibility that I suggested in 
the former chapter. In the last chapter, I will summarize my discussion and insist that the level of 
self-responsibility must be preceded by the level of morality if morality is a universal duty.
2	 The Nihilism and its concept of modern duty
The Nihilism at which I’m pointing here is the idea that the “historical ideology 
which arose when the transcendental world collapsed, and the most sophisticated values 
lost their authority and worth[2].” The ‘transcendental value’ here is the one which lasts 
eternally and exists universally and presides over things that empirically exist. The point 
of this essay is to endure this challenge of Nihilism. I will not, however, answer it by 
arguing that there is a transcendental entity or value from a Platonic perspective. The 
Nihilism in question here is the idea that there is no reason to live, or no one has a 
responsibility for their own Being, because there is no transcendental entity. This may be 
presupposing the idea: if there is no transcendental entity which gives authority over one 
to live, then there is no reason to live. The purpose of my work here is to argue that even 
if there is no transcendental entity related to one’s life, self-responsibility could be still 
possible. It is not just because of the biological dispositions which make it possible for us 
to desire to live. I think that there is a formal structure more than just a biological instinct.
To show my purpose clearly, we should find out, at first-hand, why the Nihilists 
insisted that there is no reason to live, or why many philosophers think that the challenge 
is hard to handle. I think this problem is due to the fact that we are presupposing the 
modern concept of ‘duty’. The modern concept of duty is generally used with the concept 
of ‘right’. If somebody has a right to something, then some others may have a duty to it. 
For instance, if I have a right to be paid back, then there should be a debtor who has a 
	
2	 Sang Hie Shin . (2007). Die Kritik Heidegger’s an den Nihilismus Nietzsche’s. Researches in 
Contemporary European Philosophy 15 : 691-715.
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duty to pay me back. Narveson refers to it in a formal way : 
‘A has a right against B to x’ entails ‘B has the duty to do y’[3]
He also introduces a stronger version of it. 
‘A has a right against B iﬀ B has a duty with respect to A’[4]
Coming back to our problem, Nihilists argue that there is no one who has a right to 
our lives or Being. Of course, there are many people who believe that there is one who 
has a right to their own Being. Many Christians, for instance, subscribe to this idea. God 
has a right to our lives. It is because he is the one who created us and has a plan for us. 
Therefore, committing suicide is violating his rule. Nihilists, however, insist that there are 
no transcendental entities, values, or Beings, so it is natural for them to deny the duty or 
not to take a responsibility for one’s life or one’s Being.
Also, there is a strong belief that duty is generated only if we agreed to have it or we 
take part in the contract that deﬁnes the duty. In this sense, the duty depends on whether we 
choose to take it or not. This is common sense, for example, in the law. If I have a duty to pay 
back my debt, then I should have already agreed or promised that I would pay the money back 
to the creditor before I borrow it. If I didn’t participate in the contract or if I didn’t agree to the 
duty of paying it back, then there would be no reason to pay it back. In this view, Nihilists can 
naturally claim that there was no contract or any other choice to give rise to our lives. Strictly 
speaking, we didn’t give rise to our lives, or we didn’t choose to live. Life just happened. If 
this is true, then why do we have a duty or responsibility for our own lives?
Now we made it clear what the Nihilists are presupposing. If we have a duty on 
ourselves, then we need one who has a right to it, and we have to participate in the 
contract. I will deﬁne it in this way: 
A has a duty to do x, only if there has been A’s agreement on the duty to do x, and 
there is more than one who has a right against A
	
3	 Narveson, J. (2001). The libertarian idea. Broadview Press. 44.p
4	 Narveson, J. (2001). The libertarian idea. Broadview Press. 44.p
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Because of the fact that there is no empirical entity who has right to the one to 
constrain the one’s life, and fact that the one didn’t make an agreement to cause his life or 
Being, we do not have any reason to live or do not have any duties or responsibilities for 
our lives. Even if it seems valid, however, I believe it is not.
3	  Heidegger's concept of 'Schuldig' and the 
possibility of self-responsibility
In his early work <Being and Time>, Heidegger is asking that the existence of 
Dasein necessarily entails that he is schuldig[5] : 
Where, however, shall we get our criterion for the primordial existential meaning of 
the ‘Guilty!’? From the fact that this ‘Guilty!’ turns up as a predicate for the ‘I am’. 
Is it possible that what is understood as ‘guilt’ in or inauthentic interpretation lies in 
Dasein’s Being as such, and that it does so in such a way that so far as any Dasein 
factically exists, it is also guilty (schuldig)? [6]
Heidegger insists that one is ‘responsible for something’ or ‘being guilty (schuldig)’, 
which means that the one is “Being-the-basis for a lack of something in the Dasein of an 
Other.”[7] For example, if we borrow some money and do not pay it back, then we are the 
“being-the-basis” of lacking money from the Daseins of another. However, the condition of 
‘lack of something’ is not the appropriate character of Dasein’s being guilty. It is because 
lacking for something means that something is missing as a ‘Being-present-at-hand’. But 
	
5	 What I have to make sure here is the concept of ‘schuldig’, which Heidegger mentions with his mother 
tongue. It could be translated as many ways. One of the translated words in English is ‘guilty’. I think, 
however, this is not the exact word. It is because the German word ‘schuldig’ has several kinds of senses. 
Heidegger also mentions it on the chapter which we are handling here. Those are, for example, 1) owing 2)
being responsible for 3)make oneself responsible for. What I am focusing here is the third one, ‘make 
oneself responsible for’. The translated text of <Being and Time> with English which I am referring here, 
however, prefers to translate it with the word ‘guilty’. Of course the word ‘guilt’ also has multiple 
meanings. In my intuition, however, this word seems to be closer to ‘sin’ or ‘punishment’. From this 
reason, I will use ‘guilty’ and ‘schuldig’ both, but I would like to use it as a sense of ‘responsible’.
6	 Heidegger, M. (1962). Being and time (J. Macquarrie & E. Robinson, trans.). p. 326
7	 Heidegger, M. (1962). Being and time (J. Macquarrie & E. Robinson, trans.). p. 328
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being a Dasein’s character of Being should be distinct from any presence-at-hand. Then, 
what does it mean that Dasein is schuldig (guilty)? Heidegger is saying that Dasein is guilty, 
because of the character of a ‘not’ or that the one is ‘Being-the-basis of a nullity’.
“Nevertheless, in the idea of ‘Guilty!’ there lies the character of the “not”. (...) Moreover, 
to the idea of ‘Guilty!’ belongs what is expresses without further differentiation in the 
conception of guilt as ‘having responsibility for’- that is, as Being- the basis for... hence we 
deﬁne the formally existential idea of the ‘Guilty!’ as “Being-the-basis for a Being which 
has been deﬁned by a ‘not’ “ That is to say, as “Being-the-basis of a nullity”[8]
What is it then, that Dasein is Being-the basis of a nullity? It is that the one “has been 
brought into its “there”, but “not” of its own accord.”[9]. Heidegger is focusing on the “not”. We 
can “not” help ourselves as being or not being. It is because Dasein is already “there”. Heidegger 
calls it ‘thrownness’. Dasein is already there (da), but the existing is not be chosen or decided by 
him. We cannot go back to the state of non-existence. We may recall the Nihilist’s argument, that 
we do not have a duty to ourselves because we did not agree to live. I believe this shares 
Heidegger’s point that Dasein is a Being as ‘thrownness’. Heidegger might agree that we did not 
agree to cause our own lives. It is because Dasein is a Being as thrownness. There is another 
important point here, however, which Heidegger is focusing. If it is true that we did not agree to 
live, or if it is true that we are thrown, then we cannot also deny that we are existing: 
Thrownness, however, does not lie behind it as some event which has happened to Dasein, 
which has factually befallen and fallen lies from Dasein again; on the contrary, as long as 
Dasein is, Dasein, as care, is constantly its ‘that-it-is’ [10]
Nihilists, who want to deny the worth of living, may hope to regard the “thrownness” 
as a characteristic which makes Dasein a none-duty-being. Heidegger, however, may insist 
that it only makes us sure that Dasein is already “there”. It is true that we did not agree to 
	
8	 Heidegger, M. (1962). Being and time (J. Macquarrie & E. Robinson, trans.). p. 329
9	 Heidegger, M. (1962). Being and time (J. Macquarrie & E. Robinson, trans.). p. 329
10	 Heidegger, M. (1962). Being and time (J. Macquarrie & E. Robinson, trans.). p.330
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cause our lives, but it is also true that we did not disagree to cause our lives. It means that 
the being Being as a ‘thrownness’ is independent of our own will. Whether we agree or not, 
we are here, factually.[11] Dasein as a thrownness is already “there” without our will. So, 
therefore we cannot deny our own Being. As a Being of thrownness, Dasein cannot exist 
before its basis, but only from it. “Thus ‘Being a basis’ means never to have power over 
one’s own most Being from the ground up.” This is all about the ‘nullity’. 
And there is another character of Dasein which is named ‘projection’. Heidegger 
says Dasein can “project itself upon possibilities onto which it has been thrown.”[12]
The Self, which as such has to lay the basis for itself, can never get that basis into its 
power; and yet, as existing, it must take over Being-a-basis. To be its own thrown basis 
is that potentiality-for-Being which is the issue for care.[13]
This projection is related to understanding the possibilities, or potential of Dasein’s 
Being itself. We cannot help ourselves to control ourselves to be or not to be, as a 
meaning of “thrownness”, but we can understand that the Being as a thrownness is the 
basis of ourselves and can understand its potential.
Why does the understanding - whatever may be the essential dimensions of that which 
can be disclosed in it - always press forward into possibilities? It is because the 
understanding has in itself the existential structure which we call “projection”. With 
equal primordiality the understanding projects Dasein’s Being both upon its “for-the-
sake-of-which” and upon signiﬁcance, as the worldhood of its current world. [14]
	
11	 Frankfurt refers in this way : “The concept of reality is fundamentally the concept of something which is 
independent of our wishes and by which we are therefore constrained. Thus, reality cannot be under our 
absolute and unmediated volitional control. The existence and the character of what is real are 
necessarily indiﬀerent to mere acts of our will.” Frankfurt, H. B., & Frankfurt, H. G. (1999). Necessity, 
volition, and love. Cambridge University Press. P.100
12	 Heidegger, M. (1962). Being and time (J. Macquarrie & E. Robinson, trans.). (1962). p.330
13	 Heidegger, M. (1962). Being and time (J. Macquarrie & E. Robinson, trans.). p.330
14	 Heidegger, M. (1962). Being and time (J. Macquarrie & E. Robinson, trans.). p. 174
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So, it is not only about our Being as ‘thrownness’ but also about understanding 
one’s own future. It is not the exact meaning of choosing or deciding to act something, 
but it is about the possibility. In this case, the Nihilist’s argument that we had no choice in 
our lives or ourselves is half correct and half wrong. We are still open to one’s possibility, 
and we are the only one who can do something to ourselves. In Heidegger’s view, we are 
the basis of ourselves, and the ones who can project to understand it and its possibility.
I am arguing that the two characters of Dasein are the factor of self-responsibility in 
the way Heidegger argued: Dasein is shuldig (gilty). We cannot deny ourselves in the 
meaning of thrownness, and we are in charge of our possibilities in the meaning of 
projection. We are responsible for ourselves only if we understand that we are thrown to our 
own lives and that we have a possibility to be something. I am regarding this as a condition 
which generates one’s responsibility. I am suggesting it in this way as a formal deﬁnition:
A has a self-responsibility for B if A cannot deny the existence of B and can 
understand that A is the only one who can preside over B.
I am using the concept of ‘one’s self-responsibility’ not only for the one’s own Being 
but also voluntary responsibility without any external forces. We know that we are here 
because we cannot control that we are here as a thrownness. But we are the only one who can 
preside over our lives and control our future. If we understand it, then we feel that we have a 
responsibility for our own Being or our own lives. In the next chapter, I will justify this with 
some speciﬁc examples, and argue that this deﬁnition can explain many voluntary actions.
4	 The examples of self-responsibility
The deﬁnition of self-responsibility which I suggested is not an unfamiliar one. We can 
ﬁnd it in every action in our daily lives when we ﬁnd voluntary actions in which we do not act 
indiﬀerently. We can think of a situation that we are walking through an alley on a rainy night. 
Soon, we ﬁnd a kitty at the side of the alley. If someone could not just leave the kitty there, 
then he might feel responsible for the kitty. Someone can explain that the situation is just 
because of the one’s sympathetic feeling. I can admit that there could be a pity for the poor 
cat. There could be, however, also a moral responsibility or a personal principle which is 
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related to animal welfare. This is because one cannot stop caring about the existence of the cat. 
But this condition is not enough if the case is related to one’s responsibility. If one takes the 
cat home because of self-responsibility, then he might have believed that he himself is the only 
one who can take care of the cat. It might be because it rained too heavy, so it seemed the cat 
could not pass through the night, or there were no other people around, so he may believe that 
he himself was the only person who can take the cat to the safe shelter. So, if one person took 
the cat because of his voluntary responsibility, then it is not only because he cannot deny the 
little kitty’s existence or cannot stop caring of the cat’s wellbeing, but also because he believed 
that he is the only person or appropriate person who can preside over the cat’s life.
This explains why sometimes people are not always helping others even if they are care 
about others. It is because sometimes they believe that they themselves are not the only person 
who can save the other (known as ‘bystander eﬀect’). So, it is a misunderstanding for us always 
to regard lacking charity as lacking the feeling of pity. Basically, it is true that someone who does 
not care about others, does not participate in helping others, but it is also true that someone who 
believes that he is not the only person who can help others, does not participate in helping others. 
I believe this shows that there is something between moral duty and emotivism. Moral 
behaviors are often acted out only because of pity or emotion. Some moral behavior is also 
acted only because it is his external duty. Between the two categories, however, there is 
another zone of ‘self-responsibility’. People may act without external duty, but he may also 
act something because of his self-responsibility, and not just because of his emotions.
This can explain why we are responsible for our lives when we really feel responsible 
for our lives. We cannot deny that we are thrown to this world, and we ourselves are only 
one who can preside our further lives. If we understand it, then we are responsible for our 
own lives, or our own Being, even if we cannot feel, regret or understand anything after 
death. This is also related to the phenomenon that we do not forget precious memories, even 
if we cannot feel bad about anything when we finally forget everything. It is not only 
because we cannot help recalling the precious moments but also because of the fact that I 
am the only person who can remember it and recall it. Then we feel responsible for our 
memories. To the people who believe that there is more than just emotivism, my suggestion 
of self-responsibility would help to explain it with its structure.
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5	 The level of self-responsibility
My suggestion was the possibility of self-responsibility. If we understand that we cannot 
abandon ourselves, as a Being of a ‘thrownness’, and if we understand that we are the only one 
who can take care of ourselves, as a Being of a ‘projection’, then we can take a responsibility for 
our own Being. Also, we found that this kind of structure can explain many voluntary actions, 
and these are the acts which were involved with self-responsibility. If my suggestion is valid, 
then the self-responsibility is possible. It has structural form, at least more than emotivism.
It is not true, however, that we must take the self-responsibility even if the self-
responsibility is totally possible. It is because of the logical fact that it is possible for one 
to deny something even if the one is totally capable of it. The argument here which is 
inspired by Heidegger’s concept of ‘shuldig’ cannot be placed at the level of moral law. 
Heidegger has referred as this way:
The primordial “Being guilty” cannot be deﬁned by morality, since morality already 
presupposes it for itself.[15]
Then, I am suggesting the level of self-responsibility as a level of pre-moral. What I 
am showing here is only the possibility of it. If the moral law makes people do or not do 
things universally, then self-responsibility cannot be forced universally to be taken on 
someone. Then Heidegger’s argument or my argument is not the moral argument, but an 
ontological argument. If self-responsibility is possible, then it is because we have the 
ability or are in the appropriate condition. I argued that it is necessarily possible because 
we are Dasein as a Being of ‘thrownness’ and ‘projection’.
So, I could further insist that Heidegger’s philosophy is not lacking a moral entailment. It 
is because the self-responsibility is a necessary condition of morality. This condition is preceded 
by moral law. So, we cannot force anyone to take the responsibility for his life but 
describing the possibility and capability of it in an ontological way is still possible. Of 
course, someone could deny the meaning of my suggestion, if self-responsibility cannot 
be recommended. I believe, however, showing the possibility of phenomena and showing 
	
15	 Heidegger, M. (1962). Being and time (J. Macquarrie & E. Robinson, trans.). p.332
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its structure is important by itself. Also, there could be speciﬁc possibilities that one can 
do or be something just because of the fact that one knows he has an ability or condition 
to do something. In this case, the action would be taking self-responsibility.
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